Abstract. Among all public-key cryptosystems that depend on the knapsack problem, the system proposed by Chor and Rivest (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 34 (1988), 9017909 ) is one of the few that have not been broken. The main difficulty in implementing their system is the computation of discrete logarithms in large finite fields. In this note we describe the "powerline system," which is a modification of the Chor-Rivest system that does not have this shortcoming. The powerline system, which is not a knapsack system, is at least as secure as the original Chor-Rivest system.
Introduction
Among all public-key cryptosystems that depend on the knapsack problem, the system proposed by Chor and Rivest [2] , [3] is one of the few that have not been broken [1] . The Chor-Rivest system is based on arithmetic in finite fields. It has the curious feature that its security does not depend on the apparent hardness of any weU-known computational problem, such as the discrete logarithm problem. Paradoxically, if the discrete logarithm problem in large finite fields would become tractable, then this would improve the system: it would make it easier to generate, but apparently not easier to break.
In this note we describe the powerline system, which is a modification of the Chor-Rivest system. The powerline system is not a knapsack system. It works directly in the multiplicative group of a finite field, without passing to discrete logarithms. The system depends on a collection of elements that all lie on the same line, and that are all raised to the same power. The powerline system achieves the same improvement in system generation that a solution of the discrete logarithm problem would bring about for the Chor-Rivest system.
The powerline system is at least as secure as the Chor-Rivest system, and if the discrete logarithm problem would become tractable then the two systems would be equally secure. In fact, the fastest method for breaking the powerline system that we know is first applying a discrete logarithm algorithm to reduce it to the ChorRivest system, and next breaking the latter system by means of the attack of Brickell [3, Section VIII.
Thus we see that the powerline system has a less paradoxical relation to the discrete logarithm problem than the Chor-Rivest system: the discrete logarithm problem does not enter into the system generation, but it does enter into algorithms for breaking the system.
The main advantage of the powerline system over the Chor-Rivest system is the greater freedom it allows in choosing the system parameters, since there is no need to restrict to finite fields for which the discrete logarithm problem is feasible. Using finite fields for which the discrete logarithm problem is not feasible might in fact add to the security of the powerline system. There is also a disadvantage: encryption in the powerline system is somewhat slower than in the Chor-Rivest system.
The reader is encouraged to examine the powerline system for possible weaknesses, and to find a feasible method for breaking it.
In Section 2 we describe the powerline system. In Section 3 the Chor-Rivest system, with a few inessential changes, is described. In Section 4 we prove that the powerline system is at least as secure as the Chor-Rivest system. We also compare the performance of the two versions. Section 5 contains the little we know about attacks on the powerline system. 
Description of the Powerline System
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The Chor-Rivest System
For comparison, we present here the Chor-Rivest system. 
as in (2.6) (n).
Comparison
(4.1) Security. The powerline system is at least as secure as the Chor-Rivest system. In other words, any algorithm that given the public information (2.2) and the encrypted message e(m) of the powerline system finds m, can be transformed into an almost equally efficient algorithm that performs the same function for the Chor-Rivest system. To prove this statement, suppose that the public key q, h, s, cl, c2 ..... cs from (3.2) and the encrypted form e'(m) of a message m as in (3.5) are given, and that an algorithm for breaking the powerline system is available. Then m can be recovered as follows.
(a) Construct fields Fq c Fq~ as in (2.1) (b) and (c).
(b) Determine a generator z of the multiplicative group of F~,; since q, h are the parameters of an instance of the Chor-Rivest scheme, this is supposed to be feasible (see (3. i)(c)).
(c) Let vi = z c' for 1 < i _< s, and compute z e'{'~). It is proved below that the models of F~ and F~ constructed in (a), together with the number s from (3.1) (b) and vl, v2 ..... vs, constitute the public key for an instance of the powerline system (see (2.2)), with e(m) = z ~'~'). Hence the algorithm for breaking that system that is supposed to be available can now be used to recover m.
To prove the assertion just made we may, by the uniqueness of finite fields, choose an identification of the finite fields F~ c F~h used in (3.1) and the finite fields Fq ~ Fq, constructed in (4.1) (a). Modulo this identification, let t in (2.1) (d) be the same as the element t used in (3.1). Let u in (2.1) (e) be defined by u = r a, with r, d as in (3.1) (c) and (d). Let k in (2.1) (f) be such that z = r k, and let n in (2.1) (h) be the same as in (3.1) (b). Then the elements calculated in (2.1) (i) are found to be Once q, h, and s have been chosen, the finite fields that both systems need can be constructed by means of a random algorithm of which the expected running time is polynomial in log q and h. For the rest, the running time is dominated by step (2.1)0) for the powerline system, and step (3.1)(c) for the Chor-Rivest system. Step (2.1)0) can be done by performing O(sh log q) arithmetic operations in Fq~. With the standard algorithms this takes time O(s(h log q)3), and with fast multiplication techniques O(s(h log q)2+~) for any e > 0. The time required by step (3.1)(c) will, even in favorable cases, be much more than this. How much more depends on how efficiently we can compute discrete logarithms in Fq~. The algorithm used in [3- ] runs in time s(h log q)O~l} times the square root of the largest prime factor of qh _ 1. We conclude that generally the powerline system is easier to generate than the Chor-Rivest system. It is conceivable that this information represents a weakness, so that it would be advisable to choose s somewhat smaller than q.
